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The Black Sea area has historically been of significant geostrategic importance as a connecting 
link between Europe, Asia, and the Middle East and a transit point on global East-West and 
North-South trade routes. However, its location has not made the region a vibrant zone of 
commerce, transport, energy, tourism, or cultural exchange. Rather, it has become a theater of 
struggle for dominance and competing geopolitical and geo-economic interests.  
 
The dissolution of the USSR laid the foundations for today’s Black Sea region,1 but it also 
created new challenges and caused longstanding tensions to resurface. Ethnic confrontation, 
historical remnants, and the emergence of new, independent players pursuing their own 
sovereign interests — often contrary to those of their former metropolitan state — have 
triggered antagonism and major conflicts, with Russia’s steady participation. 
 
Russia has found it difficult to adapt to the reality of neighboring countries being attracted to 
other geopolitical and economic actors and models. Unable to retain these countries within its 
sphere of influence, Moscow has adopted aggressive policies toward those post-Soviet Black 
Sea countries (BSCs) aspiring to NATO membership and EU integration. This began in 2008 
when Russia invaded Georgia and backed separatists in South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Then in 
2014, after Kyiv chose European over Eurasian integration, Russia violated Ukraine’s territorial 
integrity with the unprecedented act of annexing the Crimean Peninsula.  
 
A large number of mostly developed countries, led by the United States and the European 
Union, have imposed international sanctions on Russian businesses and individuals. While 
these sanctions have slightly weakened the Russian economy, they have done little to reverse 
 
1 In this paper the most straightforward approach is used to identify the Black Sea region by looking at the 
geographical area determined by the Black Sea catchment as a center of gravity and the six riparian states 
(Bulgaria, Georgia, Romania, Russia, Turkey and Ukraine). Furthermore, the terms “Black Sea area,” “Black Sea 
region,” “Black Sea space,” “Black Sea zone,” and “Black Sea countries” are used interchangeably.  
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the seizure of Crimea. Russia has responded with countersanctions, including a total ban on 
food imports, which in addition to achieving foreign policy goals, have served as a successful 
import-substitution protectionist measure. Furthermore, since 2014, Russia has significantly 
increased its military presence in the Black Sea, turning it into a highly militarized area.  
These developments have dire consequences for regional security and stability, disrupting 
political and economic ties in the Black Sea area and beyond. The current status quo serves no 
one. But open confrontation, compounded by a lack of trust and mutual understanding, has 
resulted in escalation that makes resolving conflicts in the region inconceivable for the 
foreseeable future. Managing these conflicts, however, is absolutely crucial and will require 
huge efforts from the BSC political elites and influential external players.  
 
A long-term solution to the security issues of the Black Sea region could be based on 
intensifying trade relations and increasing economic interdependence between the states. This 
paper first identifies major barriers toward closer trade and economic cooperation among BSCs, 
before outlining ways to overcome them.  
 
 Challenges for Black Sea regional economic cooperation 
 
In 2010, BSCs exported goods worth more than $634 billion. A decade on, total exports from 
the region globally have grown by almost 20% to more than $757 billion. However, a different 
trend has occurred with intra-regional exports, which contracted from $11.7 billion in 2010 to 
$9.4 billion in 2019. The same dynamic has played out in terms of imports to the region, which 
have increased from international partners but decreased within the region. This indicates that 
over last decade, there has been a tendency toward trade disintegration. That is, BSCs prefer to 
trade more intensively with third countries at the expense of their regional partners. The share 
of intra-regional exports in total exports dropped from 11.7% in 2010 to 10.4% in 2019, while 







2 Only one BSC can be considered as highly integrated and dependent on the region. For Georgia, the BSR is the 
main export market (a share of almost 49% in 2019) and the largest source of imports (nearly 41%). The least 
dependent on the regional market is Russia. Just 5% of its imports and around 8% of its exports are realized in 
the BSCs. Source: own calculations based on ITC data 
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Figure 1: Shares of intra-regional exports and imports in total BSR’s exports and 
imports (2010-19, %) 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on ITC data 
 
Regional cooperation in the Black Sea has faced a number of barriers. Active and frozen 
conflicts currently pose the greatest challenge not only to bilateral trade and economic relations, 
but also to future regional development. But there is another important barrier to regional 
economic cooperation: the heterogeneity of countries in the region.  
 
Countries of the Black Sea are tied together by geography but are different in so many other 
ways — territorial size, population, economic structures, and political orientation. In this sense, 
it is difficult to view the Black Sea as a region at all. Regional cooperation is greatly facilitated 
when participating countries possess a high degree of economic, political, geographical, or 
cultural similarities. The heterogeneity of BSCs have prevented them from engaging in a closer 




To start with, there is a high level of divergence in terms of economic characteristics, signifying 
a great deal of bilateral asymmetries. Russia, the region’s largest country, is home to almost 
half of the region’s total population (47.8%) and represents almost 58% of the total output. On 
the other end, Georgia is home to just 1.2% of the region’s population and accounts for a mere 
0.6% of its GDP. Romania is the region’s most economically advanced country with an income 
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per capita of almost $13,000. This makes it 3.5 times richer than the poorest economy of 
Ukraine, which in 2019 had an income per capita of just $3,700.3 
 
Second, a major impediment to closer cooperation within the Black Sea region (BSR) is a 
divergence in terms of geopolitical and geo-economic orientation. The existence of competing 
regionalisms — that is, of alternative regional integration projects — prevents the establishment 
of a free trade area among the BSCs and a true regional economic bloc. The major dividing line 
is between EU-oriented states (members Bulgaria and Romania; membership candidate Turkey; 
and associate countries Georgia and Ukraine) and Russia, which has initiated its own regional 
integration project: the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU).  
 
Since both the EU and the EAEU represent advanced forms of regional economic integration, 
simultaneous participation in both is impossible. States are therefore forced to choose which 
bloc they wish to engage with while sacrificing membership in the other. Armenia, which has 
needed to factor in security considerations as well as economic ones, made the decision that 
forgoing relations with Russia represented too much of an opportunity cost, and so has 
abandoned association agreement negotiations with the EU in order to join the Russian-led 
EAEU. In contrast, despite geopolitical and economic pressures from Russia, Ukraine preferred 
to bind its economy with the much more technologically advanced EU by signing a Deep and 
Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA) in 2014. Having lost a geo-economic 
competition with the EU to attract Ukraine to the EAEU, Russia felt its geopolitical interests 
existentially threatened, possibly triggering its aggression in Crimea. [1] 
 
In theory, the EU-Ukraine DCFTA gives Ukraine an opportunity to maintain independent 
preferential trade relations with both the EU and the EAEU. However, Russia has argued that 
tariff-free imports from the EU into Ukraine could be easily re-exported, flooding the Russian 
market and posing a threat to its economy. The implementation of the DCFTA was initially 
delayed but after unproductive trilateral talks between the EU, Ukraine, and Russia in 2015, it 
eventually entered into force on Jan. 1, 2016. In response, President Vladimir Putin signed a 
federal law unilaterally suspending the Free Trade Agreement (FTA) between Russia and 
Ukraine that had entered into force in 2012 and was ratified by eight members of the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) — Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 
 
3 Data taken from World Bank Development Indicators Database 
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Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, and Ukraine. Ukraine retaliated immediately by abolishing trade 
preferences for goods from Russia. Both countries have since continued the mutual abolition of 
trade preferences to the point where there are now no trade preferences between Russia and 
Ukraine. Instead, there is an increasing number of restrictions in bilateral trade relations. [2] 
 
Figure 2: Regional trade agreements within the BSR  
 Note: Number in brackets within the arrows indicates the year the FTA went into force; the CIS FTA between 
Russia and Ukraine was suspended in 2016; Ukraine and Turkey are currently negotiating an FTA.  
Source: Own elaboration based on WTO Regional Trade Agreements database. 
 
Georgia is the only country to currently enjoy free trade access to the markets of all Black Sea 
littoral states. This has been the case since 2012, when dialogue between Georgia and Russia 
led to a restarting4 of bilateral travel and trade through a process they termed “normalization” 
[3]. Georgia’s FTAs with Russia, Ukraine, Turkey, and the EU entered into force in 1994, 1996, 
2008, and 2014 respectively. The smallest Black Sea country is also the only one in the region 
to have established a free trade area with China (since Jan. 1, 2018).  
 
With the exception of Russia, all BSCs have entered into regional trade agreements with the 
EU. Bulgaria and Romania joined the EU and became full members of its internal market in 
2007, while Turkey established a customs union in industrial goods with the EU back in 1995. 
More recently, Georgia and Ukraine signed DCFTAs with the EU in 2014. This saw an 
alignment of both countries’ trade legislation with the EU, including in terms of competition, 
 
4 Prior to that (in 2006-12) Russia had imposed economic sanctions on Georgia banning a large part of its exports 
to the Russian market.  
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technical barriers to trade, sanitary and phytosanitary standards, customs and trade facilitation, 
and protection of intellectual property rights.  
 
The EU has always played a crucial role in Black Sea (sub)regionalism. Recognizing the 
importance of building effective partnerships with and between its neighbors for stability, 
resilience, and prosperity, the EU has strongly supported intra-regional cooperation. In 2007, 
as part of its European Neighborhood Policy, the EU launched the Black Sea Synergy Initiative 
with the aim of promoting cooperation between the EU and the countries surrounding the Black 
Sea. At the same time, the EU has deterred more intensive cooperation between the BSCs. This 
is because BSCs have always prioritized relations with the EU over intra-regional cooperation, 
which is perceived as less advantageous and secondary to European economic integration. 
BSCs have been reluctant to engage in a more advanced form of regional integration, 
prioritizing a “return to Europe” instead of creating a common Black Sea regional identity. 
 
In June 1992, BSCs embarked on regional cooperation when the leaders from Albania, 
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Georgia, Greece, Moldova, Romania, the Russian Federation, 
Turkey, and Ukraine signed the “Summit Declaration on Black Sea Economic Cooperation” 
and the Bosphorus Statement. On May 1, 1999, the Charter on the Organization of Black Sea 
Economic Cooperation (BSEC) entered into force, giving the body legal status and 
transforming the BSEC into a regional economic organization. However, with the establishment 
of the BSEC, member states also declared that their mutual collaboration will be carried out in 
a way that does not contravene their obligations in other international organizations and prevent 
the promotion of relations with third parties. [4]  
 
The BSEC has never aspired for regional economic integration; it has limited itself to economic 
cooperation. While trade is at the core of the BSEC, it has never become a trade bloc that 
institutes a free trade area and provides preferential access to member states’ markets. Most 
BSCs have achieved this through association with the EU or on a bilateral basis. After finalizing 
Turkish-Ukrainian negotiations on a regional trade agreement, all littoral states (except for 
Russia) will trade free of tariffs. Even now, through the Turkey-EU customs union and the 
DCFTA, Ukraine enjoys duty-free access to the Turkish market for industrial goods, but some 
high tariff barriers remain for agricultural trade.  
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The BSEC has established various working groups in areas such as trade and economic 
development, customs, agriculture, banking and finance, energy, transport, tourism, ICT, 
science and technology, small and medium-sized enterprises, education, and culture. Despite 
its comprehensive and ambitious agenda, the BSEC has been unable to advance beyond the 
level of exchanging views and declarations. It has not fostered the creation of a common 
political, economic, and cultural identity in the BSR. The BSEC discussions and technical 
consultations have been hindered for several reasons, including a failure to reach consensus 
among the 13 member states, lack of coordination and absence of oversight bodies, scant 
financial resources, and low administrative capacity.  
 
Anti-corruption and rule of law  
 
Another obstacle to the economic development of the region and closer economic relations 
between BSCs relates to the governance processes, rule of law, and anti-corruption measures 
of each country. Building effective democratic institutions and establishing good governance 
have been significant challenges for the BSCs. Endemic corruption, dependence on oligarchs, 
and nepotism are characteristic for the entire region. Even after 15 years of EU membership, 
Bulgaria and Romania have not fully managed to reform their governance systems, ensuring 
transparency, accountability, efficient functioning of the judiciary, and critically, elimination 
of corruption. 
 
Table 1: Scores of BSCs according to the Worldwide Governance Indicators 
Note: Percentile rank among all countries [ranges from 0 (lowest) to 100 (highest) rank] 
Source: The Worldwide Governance Indicators, 2020 update 
 
The World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators confirm the above conclusions. Bulgaria, 
Romania, and most notably Turkey, have fallen back in controlling corruption over the past 
 Control of corruption Rule of law Government Effectiveness 
2010 2019 2010 2019 2010 2019 
Bulgaria 53.3 50.5 53.1 54.8 59.3 65.4 
Georgia 57.1 74.0 47.9 62.0 65.1 76.9 
Romania 52.4 51.4 56.4 64.4 45.9 40.4 
Russia 13.3 21.6 27.0 25.0 39.7 58.2 
Turkey 58.6 44.7 58.8 44.7 64.1 54.3 
Ukraine 16.2 26.4 25.1 25.5 24.4 39.9 
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decade. Despite some progress made by Russia and Ukraine, both countries also fall well below 
global and regional standards. Georgia appears to be the only country registering improvement 




Finally, a major hurdle to economic development, trade, and investment in the BSR is its poor 
intra-connectivity. The Black Sea separates, rather than connects, the states. In addition, road 
infrastructure is relatively substandard and does not stimulate trade flows. Developing a modern 
intermodal transport and logistics system could trigger a significant boost to intra-regional 
trade. Data on the World Bank Logistics Performance Index key dimension of quality of trade 
and transport related infrastructure show that despite some improvement over the years, BSCs 
still lag significantly behind best standards regarding ports, railroads, roads, and information 
technology.5 
 
Figure 3: Scores of BSCs and the best performer from the wider region Germany according to the Logistics 
Performance Index key dimension on Quality of Trade and Transport Infrastructure 
 
Note: scores range from (1) “very low” to (5) “very high”      
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Conclusion and policy recommendations  
 
The current situation in terms of regional cooperation in the Black Sea area reflects the wide 
political, economic, social, and cultural divergences of the BSCs, which are increasingly shaped 
by various frozen and active conflicts. Divergences have not just prevented the region from 
tapping into its huge socio-economic potential and establishing strong economic interlinkages 
that take advantage of geographical proximities, but have turned the area into one of growing 
antagonism and military build-up. There is an urgent need for greater cooperation between local 
and international stakeholders and a new approach in addressing security concerns that prevents 
escalation of political tensions into armed conflicts. It is in nobody’s interest that a region 
serving as a link between Europe, Asia, and the Middle East is unstable and insecure.  
 
While security and mutual understanding are crucial for enhanced regional economic 
cooperation, there is also a reverse causality — the latter contributes to the former. Intensifying 
trade and economic interdependence could be the most effective strategy toward achieving 
long-term stability and security in the region. Taking steps to facilitate economic cooperation 
could help with a rapprochement between some countries with worsening relations. But can 
dialogue and mutual trust among bitter foes be restored, and how?  
 
Undoubtedly, overcoming the stalemate will require great political will, mindset changes, and 
a willingness to make constructive compromises. This process could be greatly facilitated by a 
mediating influential player. Best positioned for this role is the EU — the region’s largest export 
and import partner, largest foreign investor, and most important source of technical assistance 
for all countries in the Black Sea area. The EU must engage more fully in the region by trying 
to reestablish dialogue and build confidence, taking into account the interests of various states, 
and sustaining a principle of inclusiveness.  
 
Normalization of trade relations with Russia could represent a strong impetus for the Ukrainian 
economy and serve as an indispensable first step toward ensuring security and stability in the 
BSR. A restoration of trade relations requires adopting a pragmatic approach recognizing the 
economic benefits for all. The Georgian-Russian normalization policy is a useful experience 
that could serve as an example for Ukrainian-Russian relations. The two countries began a 
straight dialogue on trade and economic topics unrelated to their conflict, deliberately leaving 
aside intractable security and political issues. While this approach has not resolved 
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confrontational issues, dangerous escalation of tension was curbed and trade ties were 
reinstituted to pave the way for incremental breakthroughs in other areas.  
 
The most comprehensive indigenous intergovernmental organization that could serve as a tool 
to facilitate economic interaction among the BSCs is the BSEC. With a history of almost 30 
years, it was originally conceived as a platform for promoting trade and economic relations 
among its members and ensuring the security of the region. To advance beyond rhetoric and 
technical consultations, the BSEC requires greater administrative capacity and more funding. 
One or more member states will need to act as a locomotive and pull the agenda forward and 
try to establish common consent. That role could be played in tandem by Romania and Bulgaria. 
Both countries are relatively more advanced than the other BSEC states, both are members of 
the EU and NATO, and both participate in other regional initiatives such as the “Three Seas 
Initiative” and “17+1,” which makes them interested and able to look for possible synergies 
among the various frameworks for cooperation in the wider Black Sea area. The active 
involvement of various non-state actors (civil society, businesses, academia) at a national and 
local level is also important for the sustainability of cooperation.  
 
Of critical importance is identifying a few priority projects in areas of common regional interest 
and focusing efforts on achieving tangible results and turning them into success stories. Possible 
areas for cooperation that can have a tangible effect on regional identity and relationships 
include: 
- the environment (blue economy and green transition);  
- digital transformation and e-governance;  
- transport connectivity (developing ferry links between Black Sea ports);  
- trade facilitation (coordination between border authorities; deployment of “single window”; 
establishing an online portal with trade intelligence information for SMEs);  
- people-to-people bonds (establishment of research, educational, and cultural exchange 
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